Exchange on Public Choice
Daniel N. Shavirot
Herbert Hovenkamp's recent article, Legislation, Well-Being,
and Public Choice, asks the wrong question and answers it well.
Criticizing the public choice movement, he takes issue with the
claim that "failure in [private] markets is rare while failure in political markets is common."' In part, he argues that public choice
writers and others in the "Chicago School" have applied a double
standard, tirelessly seeking efficient explanations in private markets while shunning such explanations in political markets. Here I
find him persuasive. He also argues that political markets (probably?) work better than private markets.2 Here I am skeptical, not
because I believe the reverse but because I think the comparison is
sterile and futile-lacking a generally true answer, unprovable
even if there were such an answer, and tending to cheapen and
oversimplify our understanding of both of the objects being compared. Whether political or private markets are worse is the great
"so's your old man" debate between contemporary American liberals and conservatives, and its chief effect is to commit each camp
to a panglossian view of its favored sector, at the expense of balance and understanding. Hovenkamp did not start this debate but
it seems to have taught him entirely the wrong lesson: that panglossianism should be applied to both.'
t Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago, Law School.
1 Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U Chi L Rev 63,
99 (1990) ("Hovenkamp"). All parenthetical page references are to this'piece.
Hovenkamp uses the term "economic markets" instead of "private markets," but I prefer my terminology because it sidesteps the tedious, semantic question of whether nonwealth-maximizing behavior is "economic."
2 Hovenkamp does not commit himself irrevocably to this claim, asserting only that
"there are many reasons" for thinking political markets work better and "no obvious reason" for thinking the reverse. (p 100) I should clarify that both Hovenkamp and I use the
term "political markets" as a metaphor for the political process. We are not debating
whether a centralized command economy run by political bureaucrats would work better
than a capitalist private market economy.
3 See id ("A unified approach to economic and political markets should prompt scholars
to look hard for efficiency explanations for practices that they do'not understand in political
markets, just as they look-very hard and often very patiently-for efficiency explanations
for similar practices in economic markets."). Some might argue that scholarship is better
served by seeking explanation, rather than rationalization.
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Hovenkamp offers six reasons why political markets work better than private markets. While I do not care to join in the comparison, I think his arguments are worth addressing in turn, in order to bring out what seems to me their lack of realism about the
political process.
First, Hovenkamp argues that "the principal thing traded on
political markets is policy and information, and the costs of distributing these are very low." (p 100) This is drastically over-optimistic. As even a cursory examination of media coverage of political campaigns should make clear, information about proposed
policies and their likely effects is not the "principal thing traded."
Instead, we tend to see "horse race" journalism, ten-second sound
bites, meaningless photo opportunities, and unenlightening "it-isit-isn't" exchanges. 4 While it is tautological that information in
some sense is being traded, that information seems weakly related
to the likely policy ramifications of electing different candidates.
Even more importantly, the cost of distributing accurate information and correct understanding (to the extent these exist) is
often extremely high, not low. Mark Kelman, also a critic of public
choice theory, has noted that people often lack "more than a vague
notion about the actual ...impact of the bulk of discrete political
decisions .... [Even] econometricians ... seem to do quite abysmally." 5 Consider, for example, the question of how significantly (if
at all) minimum wage laws affect aggregate employment-a question that has failed utterly to yield an expert consensus, much less
a clear public understanding on either side. Or consider the questions of the likely effect of stiffer sentencing rules on violent crime,
of the budget deficit on our economy, and of the present and likely
future consequences of Japanese investment in the United States.
In some cases, even if there is a technically correct answer, the
public may not understand or accept it. For example, imagine trying to argue in a Presidential campaign in favor of legalizing cer-

4 See, for example, Austin Ranney, Channels of Power 81 (Basic Books, 1983); and Fox
Butterfield, Dukakis Tells of Major Errors in Race, NY Times A 20 (April 22, 1990).

1 Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical"Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va L Rev 199, 269-70 (1988). In
the full quotation, Kehnan says that people only vaguely perceive the personal financial
impact of political decisions; it seems reasonable to infer, however, that they often know
even less about, say, aggregate economic effects.
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tain drugs or ending the death penalty, even if one's position was
strongly supported by empirical research.6
Second, Hovenkamp argues that transactions costs among legislators and other political actors are low because they "can find
each other quite easily." (p 100) This facilitates legislation, but not
necessarily good legislation. One cannot begin to celebrate this ease
of communication until one knows something about legislators' incentives and how these incentives affect legislation. Do we want
more legislation rather than less?
Third, "information about political choices and about candidates' records is readily available." (p 100) Thus, presumably, voters' frequent disinterest in politics should not prevent them from
intelligently advancing their objectives (whatever they may be).
But what if misinformation, or information irrelevant to what a
candidate will do in office, is also readily available (consider President Bush's meretricious 1988 general election campaign) and cannot be distinguished from good information at the relevant level of
effort that most voters expend? Hovenkamp criticizes the claim
that "reliable political information is more difficult for voters to
obtain than reliable product information is for consumers to obtain." (p 105) He compares this claim to naive overestimates of the
power of advertising upon gullible consumers. (p 104) He fails to
perceive the significance of voters' low understanding of most issues and their remoteness from the governmental process, which
enables politicians to manipulate them with potent emotional symbols (ranging from race to "competitiveness" to the flag) that often
are only weakly related to underlying substance.8
Fourth, Hovenkamp argues that "there is no reason for assuming that people act intelligently in their self-interest when they
purchase, but ignorantly or irrationally when they vote." (p 100)
What about different levels of information and experiential feedback? Word of mouth is far more likely to catch up with a breakdown-prone car model than with a politician who promotes what
sophisticated empirical analysis would reveal to be misconceived
6 This is not to say that a government by experts would do better overall, given both
the maxim that power corrupts and the biases that experts no less than anyone else can be
expected to have.
Hovenkamp at 88 n 56, 101 nn 91-92, very briefly describes the empirical evidence on
legislators' motives. But Hovenkamp does not analyze the effect of their motives, beyond
stating conclusorily that legislators' self-interest ought to advance voter welfare just as
firms' profit motives ostensibly advance consumer welfare. Id at 101.
8 The classic work on the consequences of voters' remoteness from governmental
processes is Jacob Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (U Illinois, 1964).
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policies. Consumer products often can be assessed meaningfully
through one's own and others' experiences, whereas in politics
broad social effects generally must be assessed against the
counterfactual world that would exist if a particular decision had
not been made.9
Fifth, "although legislators may act principally in their selfinterest, that assumption is no different from the assumption of
neo-classical theory that business firms are profit-maximizers." (p
100) Hovenkamp fails to consider the high agency costs of monitoring elected officials' behavior.1 0 Low political information aside,
consider the constraints on political competition: there are only
two major parties, elections are relatively infrequent, and in most
general elections voters can choose between only two comprehensive packages of positions on the myriad issues. Moreover, it is
costly to "vote with one's feet" in the political market, whereas
consumers and investors can often cheaply change products or
firms.
Sixth, "political failure... has never been shown to be more
widespread in political markets than market failure ... in [private]
markets." (p 100) Here again, while Hovenkamp focuses on relative efficiency, it is useful to consider absolute efficiency. Even
granted widespread private market failure-for example, the sale
of aerosol products leading to destruction of the ozone
layer-political markets may also work poorly. Indeed, given
Hovenkamp's fourth and fifth arguments (which draw on similarities between political and private markets), he should agree that
failure in one market suggests that failure in the other is likely.
The aerosol example illustrates one of the principal reasons
(aside from the disproportionate, but far from infinite, power of
interest groups) for both political and private market failure. The
example involves an externality that the market price for aerosol
products fails to reflect. Politics, it sometimes seems, is ninety percent externalities. For entirely understandable reasons, voters respond superficially to issues and elect politicians based on factors
that relate only distantly, if at all, to the politicians' actual, substantive effects on society.

To clarify that I still am not arguing that private markets work better than political
markets, I should note that superiority in one particular respect (such as feedback) does not
guarantee overall superiority.
"0 See Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 Am Econ Rev 279, 282-84 (1984).
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At the risk of being overly anecdotal-since this is not the
place for a systematic analysis-let us consider the experience of
Senator Paul Tsongas, who became unusually frank in private interviews once he had decided not to run for reelection. Tsongas
had found that in order to protect his political position, he had to
seek constant television exposure at all costs, and specifically at
the cost of being an effective full-time legislator. To his good fortune, he found that he "played" well on television. People were
comfortable with him, although they generally did not remember
what he had said. Tsongas's account of his initial election to the
Senate reveals a great deal about politics in the media age. He initially lagged in the polls because voters did not know his name or
how to pronounce it. Tsongas later recalled:
What we did was put an ad on television of people mispronouncing my name ....
The end of the ad is this boy who
just obliterates my name and in frustration calls me "tickets."
That's the best he could do. That ad became a classic. I'd be
in a parade and people would call me "tickets." Literally
scores of people said they would be in the kitchen, hear the ad
come on, and run into the living room to see it. You could not
listen to that ad without smiling. That was the only ad anybody ever remembered. People would say, "I like the idea that
you could laugh at yourself." Here I think of myself as a very
issue-oriented, very substantive person, and I know in my
heart of hearts that I got elected to the Senate because my
name wasn't Smith."
One could, of course, try to interpret this anecdote as evidence
that people actually do choose between political alternatives on an
intelligent basis. For example, perhaps many voters thought that a
man who could laugh at himself would be good in other ways. Yet
these voters may have overestimated the probative value of this
information and ignored the influence of Tsongas's media experts,
who recognized and exploited the political value of self-effacing
humor. More plausibly, one could say that the voters' product
preference was to "buy" a candidate with pleasing commercials. I
agree with Hovenkamp that there is something to be said for taking consumer choice and voter sovereignty at face value (p 105); if
this is what people want, so be it. The problem is that the election
of a senator is laden with externalities, whether positive or nega-

'1

1988).

Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works 127 (Ballantine Books,
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tive-in other words, it has a range of actual consequences that
voters know little about and do not fully consider. It is just like the
case of an aerosol can, where one buys a pleasing product but some
of the effects (when millions act the same way) are excluded from
12
the decisional calculus.
One of Hovenkamp's ultimate points seems to be that, because
public choice writers oversimplify and misdescribe politics,"3 and
because they confuse wealth maximization with aggregate social
well-being (pp 68-74), we should adopt a sunny and optimistic view
of politics. He is not the first critic of public choice theory to assume that if legislation is not just rent seeking by interest groups,
it must be altruistic, socially beneficial, and a source of immense
public satisfaction. 4 This is the mirror image of the assumption by
some public choice writers that if legislation does not infallibly
promote the public interest, it must be for sale by unscrupulous
politicians to interest groups.'"
Here the fault is not entirely Hovenkamp's-indeed, it is not
at all his if he means to engage in a literature review rather than a
freestanding evaluation of politics. The fault belongs instead to the
extant legal and economic literature about the legislative process,
which until now-in sharp contrast to the largely ignored political
science literature-has largely failed to provide us with accounts
richer than the stick figures of noble public interest and venal public choice. Substantially remedying this defect in the literature,
and showing how we can enrich our understanding of politics by
recognizing and systematically analyzing human motives beyond

Technically, of course, the aerosol and political examples involve a collective action
problem as well as an externality. In the aerosol example, one ignores the marginal effect of
one's actions on the environment because considered in isolation, it is infinitesimal and thus
outweighed by the pleasure of using the product. In the political example, for similar reasons, the marginal effect of one's vote on who wins can be ignored in favor of the symbolic
or expressive pleasure derived from voting for a pleasing personality.
1S See, for example, Hovenkamp at 88 n 56 (noting empirical evidence contradicting

public choice theory).
" See id at 100-06; Steven Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in Robert B. Reich, ed,
The Power of Public Ideas 31, 35-39 (Ballinger, 1988). Hovenkamp is not entirely wrong in
arguing that the high reelection rates for incumbents suggest public satisfaction with politics; but what about the evidence that, while people like their own senators and representatives, they distrust and dislike Congress as an institution?
" See, for example, Fred S. McChesney, Regulation, Taxes, and PoliticalExtortion, in
Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle, eds, Regulation and the Reagan Era:Politics,Bureaucracy, and the Public Interest 223 (Holmes & Meier, 1989).
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selfless altruism and narrow wealth maximization, must await another day. 16

Herbert Hovenkampt
Daniel Shaviro makes some good comments about a small portion of my recent article on legislation and public choice, but by
looking at only a small part he mischaracterizes my work and misstates its conclusions. The same piece that Shaviro complains is
overly optimistic about democratic voting examined different
mechanisms for aggregating votes in a democratic system and concluded that the entire enterprise is calculated to yield haphazard
and indeterminate results, unless aided by some purely normative
guides.1 I am surprised that anyone who read my statements that
(1) the selection of one democratic method for aggregating votes
over another is arbitrary; (2) that democratic outcomes are indeterminate; and (3) that the voting process narrowly confines the
range of possible individual choices and no system "comes close"
to discerning the collective choice (p 80), would, as Professor
Shaviro does, characterize my view of political markets as "panglossian," or as presenting "a sunny and optimistic view of
politics."
I believe the section of my essay on which Shaviro comments
was quite clear about its goals. They were not to present democratic markets as perfect, but rather to point out that many scholars studying political markets begin with a quite different set of
assumptions than they do when they study economic markets, 2 and
16By this point, the reader may not be surprised to learn that I am working on my own
study of public choice theory and the legislative process. Daniel N. Shaviro, Beyond Public
Choice and Public Interest:A Model of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s (draft manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Law Review).

t Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Iowa.
1 Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U Chi L Rev 63,
74-81 (1990) ("Hovenkamp"). All parenthetical page references are to this piece.
2 Professor Shaviro objects to my use of the term "economic" markets, and prefers
"private" markets. I do not object to his term, but prefer my own, for it identifies the type
of market that is the subject matter of traditional scholarship in economics. To be sure,
political markets are "economic" in the sense that allocations made in them have an effect
on people's wealth and on the economy in general. But on the other hand, no market, in-
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that the differences are unwarranted. My point was that the dominant industrial organization theory of the 1970s and '80s assumes
that ambiguous business practices are efficient, and is extremely
reluctant to accept anecdotal evidence of inefficiency to undermine
this assumption. But often the same scholars studying political
markets do precisely the opposite. When they do not understand a

practice they quickly proclaim it inefficient, sometimes on the
thinnest anecdotal evidence. A unified approach to both political
and traditional markets requires a level playing field. Judging from
the tone of Professor Shaviro's letter, I do not believe he would

disagree with that proposition.
Shaviro also suggests that I ask the wrong question by considering the claim that "failure in [private] markets is rare while fail-

ure in political markets is common." What Shaviro apparently
means by the "wrong question" is that this is not the question he
would ask. But in fact others have addressed the question as I

stated it, and it is the one that I was addressing.
Where Professor Shaviro and I do seem to disagree is about

the efficacy of anecdotal evidence in supplying a generalized theory
for either economic or political markets. He attacks both public

choice scholarship and more optimistic Madisonian scholarship as
presenting "stick figure" pictures of the democratic process. But
every theory uses "stick figures" in the sense that it abstracts cer-

tain parts from the whole in order to produce a coherent, and
hopefully even predictive, account. If adding flesh to these bones
means telling lots of stories, I doubt that the result would be more
coherent or predictive than what we already have. Critics of both
economic markets and political markets could go on spinning yarns
forever.
For example, Shaviro gives illustrations of political advertising
that is not issue oriented, as in the Bush-Dukakis campaign. I
agree that there is plenty of such advertising to be found. But if he
is implying that this is in contrast to product advertising, I suggest
that he watch more television. He suggests that many people have
only a superficial understanding of the political process. I agree.
But most people also have a superficial understanding of both corporate policy and manufacturing processes. Should we be up in
arms about the fact that most people do not know which automobile is the safest, or which one gets the best gasoline mileage, or
which is least damaging to the environment? The point is not that
cluding the single transaction made at the comer grocery, is purely "private." Neither term
captures the differences between the two kinds of markets perfectly.
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either type of market is perfect, but that ignorance about the
workings of both is widespread. In neoclassical industrial organization theory, as I noted in my article (pp 101-02), the fact that people do not spend a great deal of time thinking about these questions or doing extensive product research before they purchase is
considered to be evidence of consumer satisfaction. Neoclassical
public choice theory, to be consistent, should begin with the same
presumption.
I also believe Mr. Shaviro confuses the substance of technical
questions that government policy addresses with the process of
public choice. He notes, for example, that there is a great lack of
consensus, even among experts, about such questions as whether
"minimum wage laws affect aggregate employment" or "what effect
stiffer sentencing rules would have on violent crime." He uses
these as support for the proposition that distributing accurate and
correct understandings of policy questions to voters is very costly. I
certainly agree that determining'the correct answer to these particular questions is difficult. But that is a public choice problem in
roughly the same sense that developing a useful electric car is a
market problem. It is essentially a technical one, only tangentially
related to market mechanisms.
Shaviro's error in this case is not uncommon. It is easy to begin with the observation that policymaking is indeterminate, and
conclude by finding fault with the democratic institutions or procedures that we use for making policy decisions. But often the failure
is not in the institutions or procedures, but rather in our inability
to produce objectively correct answers to policy questions. We will
never know the answer to every technical question about policy,
but that fact is not a democratic failure. Does Shaviro believe that
the minimum wage and optimal sentencing problems would be any
different in a society governed by an absolute dictator, whether benevolent or otherwise? The dictator would still have to decide
whether to regulate wages or leave them to the market, and would
still have to determine optimal sentences. If these problems would
still be around, then they are probably not a function of legislative
failure but rather of technical shortcomings in economics or one of
the other social sciences. Of course, the market might still be relevant. Just as the economic market might create or fail to create the
appropriate incentives for the development of the electric car, the
structure of the political decisionmaking process might affect the
rate of research into the optimal minimum wage policy or the optimal criminal sentencing policy. For example, even though the efficiency effects of a minimum wage law remain unknown, a properly
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functioning political market would tend to pass such a law if more
persons gained than lost utility from the statute.3
Finally, I agree with Shaviro that there is not much mileage in
comparing economic and political markets and deciding whether
one works better than the other, although my reasons may differ
from his. Economic markets and political markets should generally
be viewed as complements rather than substitutes; so debating
which works better is a little like debating whether pepper works
better than salt, or left shoes better than right shoes. Modern democracies use both economic and political markets simultaneously.
In most, many more resources continue to be allocated through
private bargaining than by sovereign command.
The purpose of private trading is to yield Pareto optimal, or
efficient, equilibria. The purpose of legislation is (1) to establish
the market's working rules; (2) to correct market failures; and,
most importantly, (3) to determine the distribution of entitlements
from which trading begins. The most important question is not
whether one works better than the other, but rather whether one
can exist without the other. The problem that we face is that markets yield only partial social orderings. The remaining void must
be filled by some other mode of decisionmaking.

S

See Hovenkamp 57 U Chi L Rev at 82-83 (cited in note 1).

